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International and constitutional law, originally distinct realms with limited areas of 
intersection, are getting closer and closer, particularly in the European landscape within the 
human rights protection field, where these mere contacts between the two systems have 
become intersections and overlaps.  
The present article will try to shed light on the still unsolved and problematic issues to 
which overlapping human rights protection systems give rise, by focusing on an analysis of 
the heterologous in vitro fertilization case, where both the Strasbourg Court and the Italian 
Constitutional Court delivered relevant judgments on very similar matters (ECtHR’s S.H. 
Judgment; Judgment No. 162/2014 from the Italian CC). Such analysis revealed useful in 
highlighting connections and disconnections between the different levels of protection of 
rights, and led us to argue that the development of a multilevel protection of rights is also, 
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1. The protection of  fundamental rights before the European Court of  
Human Rights and domestic Constitutional Courts. A theoretical 
framework of  analysis 
 
International and constitutional law, originally distinct realms with small areas of 
intersection, are getting closer and closer to one another. This is particularly true within the 
human rights protection field, where mere contacts between the two systems have become 
intersections and overlaps. The European landscape of human rights protection is probably 
the stand-out example of such a trend, where several “Charters” (National Constitutions, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR), the European Social Charter) and “Courts” (national Constitutional Courts (CCs), 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights) are committed to the protection 
of human rights. 
The exact terms of this relationship between such different players is still an open issue 
among legal scholars and we witness a continuous process of definition and re-definition of 
the role of Courts in the European landscape. However, all the different theoretical 
approaches to the human rights protection system in Europe converge on what is an 
incontrovertible fact: the intertwined nature of the international, supranational and 
constitutional dimensions of human rights protection. 
The present paper focuses on the relationship between the international (ECHR) and 
constitutional pillars of human rights protection – with specific regard to the Italian 
constitutional system – trying to shed light on the still unsolved and problematic issues to 
which overlapping human rights protection systems give rise. 
In the first place, we need to identify the knots which create such a tangle. 
From a formal point of view, the first intersection between the two legal orders is 
determined by the nature of the Convention: the ECHR is an international treaty to which 
the Contracting Parties have decided to be bound, and recognize as having a specific legal 
value in the domestic constitutional area. Such recognition takes place in a different way for 
each Contracting State, and the legal status of the ECHR within the national sphere is 
different too: there are States in which the Convention has been granted the status of 
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constitutional law, others in which it is in a sort of limbo between the Constitution and the 
ordinary legislation, and yet others in which it has the same status as ordinary legislation. 
At the crossroads of the Charters of Rights, we find the second area of intersection 
which characterizes the multilevel human rights protection system in Europe: the 
relationship between the ECtHR and national authorities. As it has been argued,  
 
‘while judgments of the ECtHR have no direct effect at the national level, the increasing de facto 
importance of Strasbourg case law challenges national legal orders, calling into question the role of national 
constitutional legislatures and judiciary, and ultimately, the sovereignty of the member State’ (Follesdal et al. 
2013: 6).  
 
Of particular interest is the relationship between the ECtHR and national 
supreme/constitutional courts, which is commonly referred to as “judicial dialogue”. 
Indeed, the European human rights protection system has developed primarily through the 
tension – which by the way has not been alleviated - between national courts and the 
ECtHR, with both claiming authority on human rights adjudication: the former on the 
basis of their traditional role as constitutional rights watchdogs, the latter as an 
international regional court with jurisdiction on human rights violations. As argued,  
 
‘the dynamics affecting the ECHR’s constitutional relevance in domestic and European law are not one-
sided, nor do they challenge the very structure of constitutional adjudication as provided in some 
countries; […] Rather, a mutual influence is emerging between the Strasbourg Court and national judges, 
fairly corresponding to what twenty years ago was predicted as a “form of ordered pluralism”, namely a 
Europe/States relationship which is neither reduced to the primacy of European norm over national 
rules, nor broken down in a juxtaposed collection of national and European norms which do not form a 
unitary system’ (Delmas-Marty 1992: 321). 
 
For Pinelli, ‘It is a kind of pluralism that is not merely compatible with, but stems from, 
the premises of constitutionalism, and, to that extent, contributes towards demonstrating 
that the latter is conceivable out of the old state setting’ (Pinelli 2013. 247). Moreover, such 
growing interconnection between the different levels of human rights protection has led to 
a twofold transformation of both national and international courts: on the one hand, since 
more and more national functions appear to be delegated to the international level, ‘the 
ECtHR is increasingly seen, not as an international or regional court, but as a constitutional 
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actor that participates in the formation of European public order’ (Dzehtsiarou 2015: 156); 
on the other hand, despite an apparent and potential marginalization of national courts, 
they are assigned a primary role in fundamental rights’ protection, and to accomplish this 
role they need to enter in dialogue with the ECtHR. At the same time, ‘in these 
circumstances the Court has to be open to communication from the states and be mindful 
of the signals that have been sent to the court from national authorities’ (Dzehtsiarou 2015: 
156). 
Despite the ever growing intersection between the international and constitutional 
dimensions of fundamental rights protection, their relationship remains problematic. This 
is mainly due to the ontological differences (structure, procedure, role in the overall system) 
existing between the two levels of rights’ protection. Moreover, even within each 
constitutional system the ECHR has a different position in the system of legal sources of 
law, thus having different strength and effectiveness. 
The paper is structured as follows: the first part overviews the general interconnections 
and the main differences between international and constitutional levels of human rights 
protection, focusing on the ECHR’s role within the Italian legal system (Sections 2 and 3). 
The second part moves to the analysis of national and ECtHR case law on in vitro 
fertilization, where similarities and differences between the two intertwined levels of 
protection are particularly evident. The analysis will highlight the fundamental reasons for 
similarities and differences between the two systems of protection (Section 4). Section 5 
builds up on the previous one, and will compare the different approaches, identifying 
recurrent features in the relationship between national and international systems, in order 
to improve understandings of the “intertwined but fragmented” character of global rights 
protection. Finally, in Section 6 we will try to draw some conclusion from the analysis 
conducted before. 
 
2. An intertwined path: The place of  the ECHR within domestic 
constitutional systems. A focus on the Italian system 
 
The main reason for the close interconnection between national and ECHR systems of 
protection of rights lies in the role played by the Convention in domestic orders. As 
mentioned above, the ECHR is an international treaty and, therefore, it must be respected 
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by the Contracting Parties, which, through ratification and/or execution, make the ECHR 
part of domestic legal orders. However, because of this the ECHR does not just provide 
individuals with a subsidiary and additional remedy against fundamental rights violations; it 
can also influence the interpretation and the application of domestic Bills of Rights, in ways 
that partially depend on the legal value accorded to the ECHR within the domestic order. 
On this point, as one would expect, the general approach adopted by States towards 
international law becomes particularly prominent. For the sake of simplicity, we can limit 
our analysis to the monistic and the dualistic State approach, both well known. While in 
monistic States international treaties become part of the domestic order as soon as they are 
ratified by the competent national authorities, States following a dualistic path mandatorily 
require an internal order (i.e. the “execution order”) for a treaty to be transposed into the 
domestic system. 
The prototype of the first model is Austria, where the ECHR has been considered 
since 1964 directly applicable federal constitutional law, being formally equivalent to the 
original recital of fundamental rights enshrined in the Austrian Constitution. Austria is 
most probably the ‘State which has gone furthest in incorporating the Convention’ 
(Bernhardt 1993: 27), since the rights provided by the Convention complement 
constitutional rights and have become constitutional parameters in the judicial review of 
legislation (Montanari 2002: 62). 
On the other hand, Italy – upon which the following analysis will prominently focus in 
order to provide useful elements for a better understanding of the case analyzed in Section 
4 – is an example of dualistic State, although the evolutionary trend of the last decade 
depicts a new kind of dualism, whose features are particularly intriguing for the purpose of 
this paper.  
In Italy, the ordinary law no. 848 of August 4, 1955 executed and therefore 
incorporated the ECHR into the domestic order. Consequently, it was recognized from the 
outset as having the same legal value as any ordinary parliamentary statute. Some scholars 
held a minority position (Quadri 1968: 68) proposing to interpret Article 10, para. 1 of the 
Italian Constitution (It. Const.) as also capable of influencing the ECHR legal position 
within the internal system. Since Article 10 states that ‘the Italian legal order conforms to 
the generally recognized rules of international law’, it automatically incorporates 
international customary norms into the domestic system and vests them with a 
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constitutional status. According to this minority doctrine, due to the automatic 
incorporation through Article 10 It. Const. of the customary rule pacta sunt servanda, 
international treaties too – and therefore the ECHR – would acquire such a constitutional 
value capable of prevailing over conflicting ordinary laws. However, the Italian 
Constitutional Court (CC) constantly rejected this stance, confirming that Article 10 It. 
Const. could not cover international treaty law, which, therefore, could only get the rank 
pertaining to the act used for its transposition into the domestic order.I 
Despite this strong dualistic stance that dominated the initial CC approach – an 
approach that lasted almost fifty years – such jurisprudence intermittently revealed signals 
of the CC’s awareness of the deep interconnection between the Conventional system of 
protection of rights and the national one. Indeed, it is worth mentioning for example 
Judgment no. 388/1999 (Pollicino 2015: 364),II where the Court solemnly stated that ‘the 
Constitution and the other Charters of rights integrate one another, each completing the 
interpretation of the other’.III In doing so, the CC implied that, although the ECHR was 
endowed with the formal status of ordinary statutory law, it could nevertheless influence 
the domestic application of fundamental rights by promoting an interpretation of internal 
law consistent with the principles enshrined in the Convention. 
Subsequently, growing signs of interconnection between the two systems of 
fundamental rights protection became evident in the CC’s jurisprudence following the 
Italian constitutional reform passed in 2001, which introduced a first paragraph into Article 
117 It. Const. stating that ‘Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in 
compliance with the Constitution and with the constraints deriving from EU legislation 
and international obligations’. 
Starting from the “twin judgments” no. 348 and 349, both delivered in October 2007,IV 
the CC acknowledged that, pursuant to reformed Article 117, para. 1 It. Const., the ECHR 
should be ranked at a different level within the domestic order. However, the ECHR did 
not acquire a truly constitutional status; rather, it became an “interposed” rule, placed in an 
intermediate position between constitutional and ordinary norms, and maintained a sub-
constitutional status while obtaining a supra-legislative one. Accordingly, for the first time 
in 2007, the CC asserted that the ECHR could prevail over conflicting domestic ordinary 
rule, but only as long as it did not threaten the unity and coherence of the domestic 
Constitution. 
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There are two fundamental implications within the CC reasoning. Firstly, the ECHR’s 
incorporation into the domestic order is not without limits. The ECHR, indeed, cannot 
infringe constitutional norms, be they constitutional fundamental principles or merely 
constitutional operative norms, so that it must be prevented from entering the domestic 
order, whenever such conflict arises. Secondly, only the CC can hold the power to evaluate 
the consistency of the ECHR provisions with the domestic Constitution and, if this 
condition is not met, to possibly declare unconstitutional the ordinary statute law as 
violating Conventional provisions. This means that ordinary and administrative domestic 
Courts cannot directly apply the Conventional rules while dis-applying the domestic ones. 
Conversely, whenever the latter are potentially in conflict with the ECHR, Courts are 
required to refer the question to the CC.  
Therefore, the CC firmly refused to equate the ECHR to European Union law, 
traditionally considered capable of prevailing over domestic law – the only exception being 
the supreme and untouchable principles of the domestic ConstitutionV – and of being 
applied directly by ordinary and administrative Courts, instead of the domestic conflicting 
norms.VI In other words, the CC expressly denied that ECHR could be placed under the 
scope of Article 11 It. Const.,VII which has been traditionally used to authorize the Italian 
membership of the European Union and, accordingly, to manage the relationship between 
EU and domestic law by ensuring the supremacy of the former. 
Consequently, the ECHR is not supreme. Indeed, it is up to the CC  
 
‘to establish a reasonable balance between the duties flowing from international law obligation, as 
imposed by Article 117, para. 1 of the Constitution and the safeguarding of the constitutionally protected 
interests contained in other articles of the Constitution’.VIII  
  
Conversely, on the other hand, the CC acknowledges the far-reaching monopoly held 
by the ECtHR in interpreting the Conventional provisions. Since only the Strasbourg 
Court is entrusted with the power to interpret the Convention, according to the ECHR 
legal system, the ECHR as it “lives” in the creative interpretation of the ECtHR – and not 
the bare ECHR provisions by themselves – becomes relevant in the CC constitutional 
adjudication.  
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In our opinion, this jurisprudence is particularly interesting for the aim of this paper. 
On the one hand, it highlights the fundamental role of the courts in interpreting the 
Charters of Rights and, therefore, in concretely ensuring the protection of rights enshrined 
therein. The CC is the authoritative interpreter of the domestic Constitution, while the 
ECtHR is the authoritative interpreter of the Convention, and it is precisely through the 
dialogue between these two judicial authorities that the multilevel protection of rights takes 
form. On the other hand, however, such relationships between two Charters and two 
Courts sketches out a new kind of dualism, where the boundaries between separation and 
integration inevitably blur. 
It is probably Judgment no. 317/2009 that reveals the clearest expression of such 
peculiar dualism. In the judgment the CC stated:  
 
‘It is evident that this Court cannot permit Article 117, para. 1 of the Constitution to determine a lower 
level of protection compared to that already existing under internal law, but neither can it be accepted 
that a higher level of protection which is possible to introduce through the same mechanism should be 
denied to the holders of a fundamental right. The consequence of this reasoning is that the comparison 
between the Convention protection and constitutional protection of fundamental rights must be carried 
out seeking to obtain the greatest expansion of guarantees, including through the development of the 
potential inherent in the constitutional norms which concern the same right’.IX 
 
In other words, the CC is asserting that, on the one hand, the ECHR is an external 
source of law (namely, the Constitution and the ECHR are still separated), and therefore it 
can only enter the domestic order as long as it is consistent with the supreme law of that 
order, i.e. the domestic Constitution as a whole. Accordingly, the CC is the sole and final 
arbiter of domestic fundamental rights adjudication. On the other hand, the ECHR and the 
constitutional Bill of Rights are also mutually integrated. Thus, since the aim of constitutional 
adjudication is to ‘obtain the greatest expansion of guarantees’ through a comparison 
between the conventional and the constitutional protection of rights, the two catalogues of 
rights do ultimately and definitively interplay. In conclusion, we might probably speak of a 
sort of “intertwined dualism”. 
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3. Looking at the differences: Structure, procedure and institutional 
features of  fundamental rights adjudication at the ECHR and the 
domestic level  
 
Despite the ever growing intersection between national and international levels of 
rights protection, and despite the will of the two levels to find a mutual accommodation 
and integration, there are several elements that make this path rough and tortuous. In this 
regard the different function, nature and legitimacy of national and international courts play 
a fundamental role. Even though in practice the differences are nuanced, and we can even 
see some kind of convergence between different levels of protection, nevertheless we can 
identify the main divergent features, which make the constitutional and international 
peculiar in their own function and role. 
Starting from the different roles and tasks of the international and national Courts 
involved in human rights adjudication, the brilliant statement of the Italian CC in 
Judgements Nos. 348 and 349/2007 explains it clearly:  
 
‘the Strasbourg Court has the task of interpreting the Convention, while the Constitutional Court must 
determine whether there is a conflict between a particular domestic provision and the rights guaranteed 
by the Convention in the light of the interpretation provided by the ECtHR’.  
 
Therefore, even the subjects of scrutiny differ: the Strasbourg Court is case oriented, 
being the judge of a single case; on the contrary, the Constitutional Courts’ task is that of 
judicial review of legislation. This is why even the effects of scrutiny are dissimilar: while 
the ECtHR case law aims at redressing individual violations, the CCs, on the contrary - 
even when starting from an individual application - aim at restoring the constitutional 
integrity of the system, erasing the law that infringes a fundamental right, with erga omnes 
effects. Moreover, the different aims that drive the two Courts condition both the 
flexibility, and the outcome of the judgment. Thus, the nature of individual justice 
embedded in the Strasbourg system of protection of rights drives the ECtHR to condemn 
the respondent State when a violation of rights occurs in a particular case, regardless of 
whether there may exist a widespread national praxis according to which the law involved – 
which produced the infringement in this instance – is normally interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the protection of rights. On the other hand, CCs, being by their very nature 
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a tool intended to preserve the integrity of the whole order entrenched in the judicial 
review on legislation, are not inclined to declare a law unconstitutional when there is the 
possibility that it may be interpreted in a fundamentally rights-oriented way. 
Even when looking at procedures, we see more differences than similarities. For 
example, a typical feature of the ECtHR is the possibility given to the judges to make 
concurring or dissenting opinions (White and Boussiakou 2009: 37-60). In contrast, in the 
Italian Constitutional Court, as in many other European supreme courts, such a possibility 
does not exist. Even the different rules of access to the Court play a considerable role: 
individuals who consider that their human rights have been violated can lodge, directly, a 
complaint before the ECtHR, after having exhausted all domestic remedies. The rules of 
access to national supreme courts differ widely from one country to another: for example, 
while in Germany and Spain applicants can lodge a direct complaint to the Constitutional 
Court, in Italy the access is exclusively incidental and only a judge can raise the question to 
the CC. 
Beside these structural and ontological differences, which pertain to the nature of the 
two different systems, there are other lines of differentiation that affect the question of 
which is the authority legitimized to pronounce the last word on human rights 
adjudication. The core issue of the role of the judiciary in protecting fundamental rights 
concerns the problem of its legitimation and the “counter-majoritarian argument”. While 
national Constitutional Courts rely on the provisions of the national Constitution for their 
legitimacy and authority, the ECtHR, like other international courts, depends on an initial 
consent among member States for its legitimacy. However, such consent can evolve and 
change over time: this is the reason why the legitimacy of the Court is built on the concept 
of consensus, which is ‘an updated consensus because it reflects the current state of law 
and practice among the Contracting parties’ (Dzehtsiarou 2015: 152). 
 
4. Intertwined but different in action. A case study: The heterologous 
In Vitro Fertilization 
 
Despite the differences highlighted above, in time, both the ECtHR and national 
judges have become more and more aware of the necessity of dialogue and have developed 
several instruments (the margin of appreciation tool, the consensus theory, the 
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interpretation of national legislation in compliance with the Convention, the principle of 
subsidiarity, the dynamic interpretation of the Convention) in order to deal with each other 
in a ‘pluralistic, polyvalent and heterarchical’ (Dzehtsiarou 2015: 156) landscape. However, 
their relationship has only developed case by case; it is still critical and in certain cases even 
confrontational. 
This is especially true in those cases concerning “ethically controversial matters” or 
moral matters (abortion, end of life, gender related rights, assisted reproduction, freedom 
of religion) in which the ECtHR and national supreme courts seem to move on different 
argumentative tracks. 
This paper will focus on one of the most complex and sensitive ethical issues recently 
addressed both by the ECtHR (S.H. v. Austria)X and by national supreme courts (Italian 
Constitutional Court Judgment no.162/2014): gamete donation for in vitro fertilization. 
In both cases, the applicants challenged national law provisions (in the one case the 
Austrian Artificial Procreation Act, in the other the Italian Law n. 40/2004) which posed 
restrictions on the practice of heterologous fertilization. In particular, the Austrian law 
declared an absolute ban on ova donation, both in vivo and in vitro, and a ban on sperm 
donation for in vitro fertilization, but not in vivo fertilization. The Italian law was even 
stricter, ordering an absolute ban on every kind of heterologous fertilization. Even though 
the cases are highly comparable and the rights to be protected present many common 
elements, different conclusions were reached as to the balance of such rights, resulting in 
completely opposite judgments by the ECtHR and the Italian Constitutional Court: the 
ECtHR upheld the ban, while the Italian CC declared the ban a violation of fundamental 
constitutional rights. 
This case study is emblematic of overlapping areas in human rights jurisdiction and is 
an outstanding example of the different approaches adopted by national and international 
courts in dealing with human rights adjudication. 
In particular, this contribution aims, through the analysis of the ECtHR and the Italian 
CC cases, to shed light on such different approaches (which led in the case under 
examination to opposite conclusions). It will seek the reasons for these divergences and 
will address the vital question of who is the guardian of fundamental rights in the pluralistic 
landscape of European space. 
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4.1. S.H. v. Austria before the European Court of Human Rights 
One of the ECtHR’s leading casesXI on IVF is the well-known S.H. and Others v. Austria 
(Kete 2014), decided in 2011. The Grand Chamber decision is relevant for different 
reasons. First of all, it shows the different approaches of the ECtHR and Austrian 
Constitutional Court which ruled on the same case in 1999. Secondly, by reversing the 
previous decision of the First Section of the ECtHR, the Grand Chamber upheld Austria’s 
restrictions on assisted reproduction. Last but not least, the decision represents a sort of 
“manifesto” of the ECtHR approach to ethical sensitive rights adjudication, in which the 
Court makes broad use of the margin of appreciation and the theory of consensus. 
The case originated in 1999 when the Austrian Constitutional Court ruled on the 
application of two couples, whose reproductive organs were affected by certain 
reproductive diseasesXII which could only be solved with the use of different IVF 
techniques (in vitro fertilization using the sperm of a donor or heterologous fertilization). 
None of these techniques was allowed under the Artificial Procreation Act. The applicants 
argued before the Austrian Constitutional Court that the law’s provisions were in breach of 
art. 8 ECHR and of art. 7 of the Austrian Constitution (the latter protecting equal 
treatment). The Austrian Constitutional Court, whose function - among others - is that of 
ruling on the compatibility of the national legislation with the ECHR, given the 
“constitutional status” of the ECHR mentioned above, recognized that the impugned 
provisions interfered with the right to family life according to art. 8 ECHR; however, such 
interference was justified by the attempt performed by the legislature to properly balance 
the conflicting interests of human dignity, the right to procreation and the child’s interest. 
The Court underlined the legitimate rationale under the law provision, which was to avoid 
the creation and development of unusual family relationships, such as a child having more 
than one biological mother, and to avoid the risk of exploitation of women donating ova. 
Moreover, the Court found that the ban on heterologous fertilization was not in breach of 
the principle of equality, given the substantial differences between homologous and 
heterologous techniques. 
In 2000, the applicants applied to the ECtHR, and the First Section in 2010 stated, in 
S.H. and Others v. Austria; this First Section decision reversed the Constitutional Court’s 
conclusions, finding a violation of art. 14 and art. 8 ECHR. Finally, in 2011, the Grand 
Chamber issued its decision on the case, upholding the Austrian legislation. 
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The Grand Chamber in S.H. v. Austria first of all recognized that the right for a couple 
to conceive a child and to make use of assisted reproduction techniques for that purpose is 
protected by Article 8 of the Convention, because it is an expression of private and family 
life. Member States, within their margin of appreciation, can adopt measures aimed at 
guaranteeing an effective respect for private and family life. However, such measures have 
to be ‘in accordance with the law’; they have to pursue one or more legitimate aims and 
they ‘have to be necessary in a democratic society’. In the case under examination, 
according to the Court, such measures were laid down in the Artificial and Procreation Act, 
which ‘pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of health or morals and the 
protection of the rights and freedom of others’ (para. 90). 
In particular, the rationale underlying the prohibition of ovum donation for in vitro 
fertilization laid down by section 3.1 of the Artificial Procreation Act responds to the risk 
embedded in heterologous fertilization with ovum donation, namely, the threat to the basic 
principle of mater semper certa. We are referring to the split of motherhood between a genetic 
mother and another merely carrying the child, as well the risk of the exploitation of 
women, particularly those in economic or social difficulties. 
More complex is the reasoning concerning the prohibition of sperm donation for IVF. 
Under the Austrian legislation, in fact, sperm donation is not banned in every case, but 
only in that of in vitro fertilization, while in vivo fertilization is allowed. Moreover, IVF 
with sperm donation combined two techniques which, taken individually, were allowed 
under the Austrian legislation: in vivo fertilization with sperm donation and in vitro 
fertilization. In the previous decision concerning the case under examination, the Chamber 
argued that the only reason underlying the prohibition of the combination of two medical 
techniques, which taken individually were allowed, was the fact that ‘in vivo artificial 
insemination has been in use for some time, was easy to handle and its prohibition would 
therefore have been hard to monitor’. The Chamber considered such an argument, related 
only to a question of efficiency, inconsistent in order to justify the prohibition of sperm 
donation for IVF. The Grand Chamber, on the contrary, reversed the Chamber’s decision, 
arguing that  
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‘when examining the compatibility of a prohibition of a specific artificial procreation technique with the 
requirements of the Convention, the legislative framework of which it forms part must be taken into 
consideration and the prohibition must be seen in this wider context’.  
 
Starting from this premise, the Court stressed the fact that the prohibition of sperm 
donation for IVF, rather than in vivo fertilization, showed ‘the careful and cautious 
approach adopted by the Austrian legislature in seeking to reconcile social realities with its 
approach of principle in this field’ and it was therefore compatible with art. 8 of the 
Convention. However,  
 
‘even if it finds no breach of Art. 8 in the present case, the Court considers that this area in which the 
law appears to be continuously evolving and which is subject to a particular dynamic development in 
science and law, needs to be kept under review by the Contracting States’ (para. 118). 
 
The application of the theory of margin of appreciation in connection with the theory 
of consensus, in its different meanings (European and internal consensus), played a central 
role in the Court reasoning. 
Firstly, the Court recognized that in cases where an important facet of an individual’s 
existence or identity is at stake, the State normally sees its margin being narrowed down. 
However, in the case of IVF, the margin accorded to the State has to be a wider one, given 
the lack of a long-standing consensus among Member States on the moral and ethical 
issues involved. 
As we may all know, in fact, the margin of appreciation and consensus are intuitively in 
an inversely proportional relationship: the more widespread and settled the consensus, the 
narrower the margin; and conversely, the weaker and more unsettled the consensus, the 
wider the margin. This explains why in sensitive matters like the one analyzed in this paper, 
the margin is usually quite wide, since consensus is still ‘emerging’ and not yet ‘based on 
settled and long-standing principles’ (para. 96). 
In particular, the Court recognized an emerging consensus among Member States in 
allowing gamete donation for IVF. However, this consensus is not based on long-standing 
principles embedded in the law of Member States; rather, it reflects only ‘a stage of 
development within a particularly dynamic field of law and does not decisively narrow the 
margin of appreciation of the State’ (para. 96). 
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If the lack of European consensus was used by the Court in order to justify the wide 
margin of appreciation accorded to the Austrian legislator, the lack of internal consensus 
within the national society was used to further sustain the legitimacy of Austrian legislation. 
The Court argued, in fact, that the prohibition of gamete donation reflected a cautious 
approach by the Austrian legislator toward a matter which raises complex questions of an 
ethical nature and on which there is not yet a consensus in society. In contrast, the Court 
seemed to use the concept of internal consensus in order to justify the permission of sperm 
donation for in vivo fertilization, which was recognized as ‘a technique which had been 
tolerated for a considerable period beforehand and had become accepted by society’ (para. 
114). 
The argument in S.H. v. Austria is emblematic of the flexible use of the consensus 
theory by the Court:  
 
‘throughout its existence the Court has used different types of consensus in its reasoning, and has not 
clearly distinguished among them, thus leaving some uncertainty as to both the precise meaning of 
consensus and the relative weighting of the different kinds of consensus deployed’ (Dzehtsiarou 2015: 
39). 
 
4.2. Judgment no. 162/2014 from the Italian Constitutional Court 
On a very similar issue, concerning Italian IVF legislation, Judgment No. 162/2014 
from the Italian CC declared Article 4 of Law No. 40/2004 to be unconstitutional in so far 
as it introduced a complete ban on resorting to heterologous artificial insemination, even 
when one member of the couple suffers from absolute and irreversible sterility.XIII Such a 
ban indeed violated Articles 2 and 3 (respectively protecting, as a general clause, inviolable 
rights and the principle of equality), as well as Articles 29, 31 and 32 of the Italian 
Constitution, which are more specifically addressed to guaranteeing family life and health, 
the latter conceived both as individual right and as interest of society as a whole. 
Law No. 40/2004, approved by the Italian legislature with the declared purpose of 
facilitating the solution of procreative problems arising from human sterility or 
infertility,XIV had been already been challenged before the Italian CC, which had questioned 
from the beginning its “value oriented” structure as disproportionately privileging the 
protection of embryos.XV In Judgment No. 162/2014, the Italian CC confirmed its general 
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mind-set when dealing with sensitive issues, and reaffirmed its previous approach with 
regard to in vitro fertilization issues. More precisely, it reiterated first of all that a judicial 
review of Law No. 40/2004 was to be performed, jointly considering all the constitutional 
parameters invoked by the referring courts. Since IVF involved ‘numerous constitutional 
questions’,XVI and Law No. 40/2004 consequently impinged on a variety of interests, all 
having a constitutional status, a balanced approach was required in order to grant each of 
these interests an adequate protection. The safeguarding of embryos, indeed, is not 
absolute; it encounters limits in the need to protect a legitimate claim to procreation. 
Secondly, the CC stated that the identification of a reasonable balance between all the 
conflicting interests at stake pertains primarily to the political evaluation of the legislature, 
which in matters like this is called on to adequately take into consideration the fast-moving 
developments of medical scienceXVII too. Lastly, the CC confirmed that, although 
important, such a political discretion cannot affect the power of the CC to review the 
“non-unreasonableness” of the legislative decision. 
Before analyzing in more details the reasoning followed by the CC, and in order to 
better appreciate its relevance for the purposes of this paper, it may be interesting to briefly 
examine the background of this Judgment. 
Initially, questions of constitutionality concerning the ban on heterologous 
insemination were raised by the Courts of Milan, Florence and Catania before the 
Constitutional Court, with the latter preferring not to rule on the issue, adopting an 
interlocutory order instead. This order, No. 150/2012, returned the case to the referring 
judges, for a reconsideration of the prerequisite of the questions in the light of the ECtHR 
Grand Chamber’s decision in S.H. v. Austria. The referring courts had challenged the 
constitutionality of the ban, in particular, though not exclusively, with regard to Article 117, 
par. 1 It. Const.,XVIII which would have been indirectly breached through the violation of 
Articles 8 and 14 ECHR as stated by the First Section of ECtHR with reference to the 
similar Austrian prohibition of gamete donation for IVF. Therefore, the CC considered the 
Grand Chamber’s decision, reversing that of the First Section on the same issue and 
declaring that the Austrian Law did not violate the ECHR, as a kind of jus superveniens,XIX 
able to trigger a different consideration by the referring judges of the issue at stake. In 
Order No. 150/2012, indeed, the CC reiterated that ‘when a modification of the 
constitutional parameter occurs after the issue of constitutionality is raised, or when the 
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normative context is subject to substantial modifications’,XX a return of the case to the 
referring court is necessary for a re-examination of the aspect of the issue affected by the 
normative modification. Moreover, the CC underlined that such a return was essential in 
the case under consideration, because in the referring courts’ arguments ‘the challenge 
related to Article 117 stands out from the others’. Accordingly, it seemed that the CC had 
assumed that the remaining parameters invoked (Article 2, 3, 29 and 31 It. Const.) were 
“absorbed” by the “main” parameter, i.e. Article 117. 
Order No. 150/2012 was considered therefore not only a further step in the trend 
followed by the Italian CC in assigning relevance to ECHR provisions – as interpreted by 
the ECtHR – within the domestic review on legislation (Malfatti 2012), but also a 
significant departure by the CC from the usual argumentative scheme adopted in its 
previous case law. Thus, since the issues of constitutionality referred to the CC, though 
focused on the challenge related to Article 117, challenged other parameters of the Italian 
Constitution as well, returning the case to the referring courts following a ECtHR decision 
could have meant giving priority to the solution of the issues of conventionality (i.e. 
concerning compliance with the ECHR) over the issues of domestic constitutionality 
(Morrone 2012). 
After Order No. 150/2012, the three referring courts – Milan, Florence and Catania – 
once again raised the question of constitutionality concerning the ban on heterologous 
insemination before the CC, which, as mentioned above, declared the ban unconstitutional. 
We can summarize the Italian CC’s legal reasoning as follows. The Court firstly 
asserted that the complete prohibition of gamete donation for IVF does not arise from a 
duty to comply with international obligations which merely prohibit the use of medically 
assisted procreation for eugenic purposes;XXI it is not the result of settled and long-standing 
principles established in the system, having been introduced by Law No. 40/2004 itself. It 
does not possess a constitutional basis, either; although an IVF regulation can be required 
by the Italian Constitution to avoid a legal vacuum in procreative matters – and 
accordingly, for this reason, Law No. 40/2004 was qualified as a “constitutionally 
necessary” law by the Italian CC – its content does not derive from the implementation of 
constitutional principles, at least in so far as it concerns the ban on heterologous 
insemination.XXII Quite the opposite: since the ban infringes other constitutional values, 
unless it can be proved that the protection of embryos cannot be pursued in a different 
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way, a strict test of reasonableness and proportionality has to be performed in order to 
assess its consistency with constitutional principles. 
On the other hand, the choice to found a family and to procreate is an expression of a 
fundamental freedom of self-determination, protected by Articles 2, 3 and 31 It. Const., so 
that its limitation – and even more its total sacrifice, as it happens in the case under 
examination – needs to be justified by the pursuit of other constitutional values. Of course, 
the freedom to procreate is not without limits. However, such limits, even if inspired by 
ethical beliefs, cannot be equivalent to a complete prohibition. The only interest that may 
oppose a couple’s demand to procreate by heterologous IVF is the protection of the 
children born as a result of this medical technique, with respect to their right to be 
informed about their real ancestral descent and the risk of psychological disease arising 
from membership of an unusual family where the biological parenthood is unconnected to 
the natural one. But apart from the fact that similar problems also arise in adoption issues – 
as demonstrated by Judgment No. 278/2013, concerning the absolute right to anonymity 
of the natural mother in case of adoption, which the Italian CC declared partially 
unconstitutional – the totality of the relevant legislation appears to already guarantee 
satisfactorily the interests of the child born by heterologous IVF. Moreover, the regulation 
of IVF impinges on the right to health, which is also to be conceived as psychological 
health, and the difference between homologous and heterologous insemination cannot be 
considered relevant to this. In conclusion, the ban under examination is disproportionate 
and irrational, also considering that by de facto stimulating “procreative tourism”, it 
discriminates couples on the basis of their economic condition. And therefore, it is 
unconstitutional. 
In doing so, the Italian CC went above and beyond what the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber 
had suggested in the S.H. Judgment, when it considered the analogous ban provided for in 
the Austrian legislation compatible with Article 8 ECHR. It is also worth mentioning that 
the unconstitutionality of the ban on gamete donation for IVF was not declared in the 
Italian CC’s Judgment as a result of the violation of specific constitutional rights 
considered individually, but rather of the largely unfair balance adopted at legislative level 
between all the conflicting interests at stake (Morrone 2014). 
However, above all, it is worth stressing that Judgment No. 162/2014 ruled the case 
purely in the light of internal constitutional parameters: the challenges relating to Article 
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117 It. Const. and concerning the violation of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR remained merely 
“absorbed” in the reasoning pertaining to the other parameters invoked in the issue of 
constitutionality. This circumstance is even more surprising if we consider the content of 
Order No. 150/2012, in which - as already highlighted - the internal parameters invoked 
(Article 2, 3, 29 and 31 It. Const.) had been arguably deemed “absorbed” by the parameter 
of Article 117. Judgment No. 162/2014 seems, therefore, in this respect a total reversal of 
the perspective adopted in Order No. 150/2012; this also demonstrates that the CC could 
have ruled on the merit of the case in 2012, arriving at the same outcome as later reached 
in Judgment No. 162/2014, though at that time it preferred not to settle the case. 
 
5. A comparative analysis: connections and disconnections between the 
ECHR and the Italian constitutional level in the heterologous IVF case 
 
The brief analysis of the ECtHR’s and the Italian CC’s decisions on this matter – which 
depict one of the most emblematic examples of the intertwined, but different nature of 
fundamental rights adjudication at international and constitutional level - explains quite 
clearly why we chose the IVF case as the focus of this paper.  
First of all, interconnections and differences are apparent by merely looking at the 
Italian CC’s decisions on heterologous IVF. On the one hand, in Order No. 150/2012 the 
interconnection between systems arises unequivocally. The same Italian CC seems so aware 
of such interconnections that it chooses not to decide the issue of constitutionality and to 
return the case to the referring judges for a re-evaluation of the questions in the light of the 
ECtHR Grand Chamber’s decision in S.H. On the other, however, Judgment No. 
162/2014 also provides evidence of the deep differences between the ECtHR and a 
national CC in approaching similar issues, as even the ECtHR seems to understand 
perfectly. Indeed, in the later Parrillo v. Italy case,XXIII the Strasbourg Court noted:  
 
‘admittedly, in Order No. 150 of 22 May 2012, in which it remitted to the lower court a case concerning 
the ban on heterologous fertilization, the Constitutional Court did refer, inter alia, to Articles 8 and 14 of 
the Convention. The Court cannot fail to observe, however, that in its judgment No. 162 of 10 June 
2014 in the same case, the Constitutional Court examined the prohibition in question only in the light of 
the Articles of the Constitution that were in issue (namely, Articles 2, 31 and 32)’ (para. 95).  
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We can deduce that the ECtHR wished to underline that protection ensured in the light 
of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR is not the same as protection purely embedded in domestic 
parameters of the national Constitution, and this is probably a further confirmation from 
the Strasbourg side too that the two levels of protection, even though intertwined, are 
nevertheless still different. 
Interconnections and differences, however, appear also by comparing the Judgment 
No. 162 and the S.H. decision. Here, the most visible difference lies, obviously, in the 
opposite results achieved by the two Courts in adjudicating the case. While the ECtHR 
found no violation of Article 8 ECHR, the Italian CC declared the analogous Italian ban on 
heterologous insemination unconstitutional. 
This difference of outcome, however, probably depends on the different type of 
scrutiny carried out by the Courts: the ECtHR looked uniquely into the alleged breach of 
Article 8 ECHR, while the CC took into consideration the constitutional framework as a 
whole. As mentioned above, the unconstitutionality of the Italian ban on heterologous IVF 
was not declared as a result of the violation of specific constitutional rights considered 
individually, but rather of the largely unfair balance adopted at the legislative level between 
all the conflicting interests at stake. We do not see it as a coincidence that, in Judgment No. 
162/2014, the CC started by saying that its review would take into account all the 
parameters invoked, and consider them jointly, in order to prevent the protection of certain 
fundamental rights from developing in an unbalanced manner to the detriment of other 
rights also protected by the Constitution.XXIV 
But a further difference between the two systems, international and constitutional, may 
ensue from such a different approach in adjudicating human rights issues. From the duty to 
take into account all of the Constitutional parameters jointly, even when an issue of 
compatibility with an ECHR right is at stake, the CC derives, in fact, a right to claim what it 
names “its own margin of appreciation” in assessing the role played by the ECHR - in the 
interpretation provided by the ECtHR - within the domestic system. Accordingly, both 
Courts expressly resort to the “margin of appreciation doctrine”. It is, however, obvious 
that the margin of appreciation as conceived and claimed by the CC is something different 
from the margin of appreciation as originally developed by the ECtHR.XXV  
As clearly stated in Judgment No. 317/2009, although the CC cannot substitute its own 
interpretation of a provision of the ECHR for that of the Strasbourg Court,  




‘it may assess how and to what extent the results of the interpretation of the European Court interact 
with the Italian constitutional order. [...] In summary, the national “margin of appreciation” can be 
determined having regard above all to the overall body of fundamental rights, the detailed and overall 
consideration of which is a matter for the legislature, the Constitutional Court and the ordinary courts, 
each within the ambit of its own jurisdiction’ (§7). 
 
We could probably say that the clearest deployment of “its own margin of appreciation 
doctrine” is found in the Italian CC’s well-known “Swiss pensions case”, in which a 
challenge to legislation was at stake, retrospectively modifying the arrangements applicable 
to the calculation of pensions for workers who had spent all or part of their working life in 
Switzerland.XXVI The retrospectivity of this new calculation mechanism had already been 
challenged before the ECtHR, which had condemned Italy for violation of Article 6 
ECHR, since the domestic law of “authentic interpretation” had the ‘effect of definitively 
modifying the outcome of the pending litigation, to which the State was a party, endorsing 
the State position to the applicant’s detriment’.XXVII Despite this fact, and even in view of 
the Maggio case, the CC held that the appellant had no right to expect that his pension 
would be calculated in line with the previous arrangements, since the contested legislation 
was inspired by the principle of equality and solidarity, which prevailed within the 
balancing of constitutional interests. More precisely, the CC affirmed that,  
 
‘within the balancing operation against other interests protected under constitutional law which this 
Court is also required to consider in this case, the protection of other countervailing interests, which are 
of equal constitutional standing, affected by the contested legislation, prevails over the protection of 
interests underlying the principle of constitutional law [of the non-retrospectivity of the law]. Therefore, 
in relation to this balancing operation, there are compelling general interests capable of justifying the 
recourse to retrospective legislation’.XXVIII  
 
As a consequence, the CC declared the question of constitutionality ill founded, and in 
doing so, it claimed its authority not to comply with the ECtHR’s decision which had 
condemned Italy, on this same issue.  
Probably, this Judgment may also be considered as one of the clearest displays of that 
‘functional disobedience’ deployed by domestic Courts when wishing to draw the ECtHR’s 
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attention to national competing interests and values that were not sufficiently taken into 
consideration by the latter, as some Authors have exemplarily highlighted (Martinico 2015: 
303). What is sure, however, is that, as can be observed in the CC jurisprudence, by 
deploying “its own margin of appreciation” the CC does not directly challenge the 
ECtHR’s judgments; it can merely deprive the latter of their effectiveness within the Italian 
system in the light of a systemic interpretation of the constitutional framework as a whole. 
Accordingly, it is a margin of appreciation claimed against the ECtHR, and after the latter 
has settled the case, whilst at the same time avoiding an open conflict with the European 
Court. The CC seems to be wishing to say: 'I respectfully disagree' (Martinico 2017: 417). 
With regard to the Strasbourg side, and as highlighted by Sir Nicolas Bratza, a former 
President of the ECtHR, the margin of appreciation was instead introduced into the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence as a ‘valuable tool devised by the Court itself to assist it in defining 
the scope of its review’. It does not provide blanket exceptions in the application of rights; 
rather, it ensures that human rights under the ECHR develop according to a pluralistic 
pattern, enabling its ‘striking an optimum equilibrium between convergence and divergence 
in a transnational or international setting’ (Rosenfeld 2008: 450). Even though it could 
seemingly jeopardize the universalistic ambition naturally implied in the international 
protection of human rights, the margin of appreciation doctrine was introduced as a useful 
tool to accommodate diversity in the field of human rights: it is believed to be a kind of 
‘key to ordering pluralism’, meaning that ‘on the one hand, it expresses the centrifugal 
dynamic of national resistance to integration’ and ‘on the other, since the margin is not 
unlimited but bounded by shared principles, it sets a limit, a threshold of compatibility that 
leads back to the centre (centripetal dynamic)’ (Delmas-Marty 2009: 44).  
Hence, the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation allows States to approach fundamental 
rights issues in the light of their national Constitutional identity, since they are allowed to 
find the most satisfactory solution to rights protection, one that is also coherent with the 
moral and social values embedded in their national systems. Conversely, when the majority 
of Contracting States shows a common trend in dealing with a specific issue, the ECtHR 
infers that a general consensus among States exists on the protection required for the 
Conventional right at stake, and that, therefore, the need to preserve the single national 
constitutional identity may be pushed into the background. Consequently, it is no 
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coincidence that the margin of appreciation and consensus among States are in an inversely 
proportional relationship, as already pointed out above. 
Actually, the ECtHR’s doctrine of the margin of appreciation allows flexibility in 
reviewing the State’s compliance with the ECHR, by recognizing that, as far as it is 
possible,  
 
‘by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the State 
authorities are, in principle, in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion, not only 
on the “exact content of the requirements of morals” in their country, but also on the necessity of a 
restriction intended to meet them’.XXIX  
 
Accordingly, we can argue that the margin of appreciation is also a legitimizing tool for 
the ECtHR, which - as an international court - needs to rely on States’ consent to ensure 
that its judgments are effective.  
Instead, the CC does not need to seek for legitimacy. It already possesses its own 
legitimacy, directly stemming from the domestic Constitution, which entrusted the CC with 
the task of preserving the constitutional integrity of the national system. It follows that, 
while the ECtHR resorts to the margin of appreciation to get legitimacy, by deploying its 
own margin of appreciation the CC exhibits its constitutionally embedded legitimacy, and it 
claims its authority on constitutional matters. In conclusion, it is only apparently that the 
ECtHR and the CC refer to the same doctrine, when they speak of margin of appreciation. 
Rather, as a matter of fact, their margin of appreciation has a different meaning and 
performs different functions. Judgment No. 162/2014, though at that time it preferred not 
to settle the case. 
 
6. Taking stock: A tale of  two Courts at the crossroads at the protection 
of  rights 
 
The analysis of the heterologous IVF case highlighted how the connections and 
disconnections between the international and constitutional level of protection of rights, 
theoretically depicted in Sections 2 and 3 of this contribution, operate concretely. Along 
with a deep awareness of the intertwined nature of fundamental rights adjudication 
nowadays, shown by both Courts in their case law, Judgments on heterologous IVF 
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emphasize also several differences, pertaining to the outcome of the scrutiny, the approach 
taken and the apparent resort to the same doctrine by the two Courts involved – i.e. the 
margin of appreciation –, which is conversely very differently deployed. 
However, looking again at Judgment No. 162/2014 in its connection with Order No. 
150/2012 and the Grand Chamber’s S.H. Judgment, further considerations may arise, 
arguably shedding light on one of the most controversial bonds in the multilevel protection 
of rights: the relationship between Courts. 
It is worth mentioning, that in Judgment No. 162/2014, the Italian CC did actually 
make use, at least in part, of the legal reasoning adopted by the ECtHR in the homologous 
S.H. case, by completely embracing the idea that;  
 
‘the couple’s choice to become parents […] is an expression of the fundamental and general freedom of 
self-determination. […] And as a consequence, limits to this freedom are to be reasonably and adequately 
justified by the impossibility of otherwise protecting interests having the same rank. Since the most 
intimate and intangible sphere of the human person is involved, the determination to have children or 
not is incoercible…’.XXX. 
 
However, it did so by completely neglecting to expressly mention the ECtHR’s case 
law in its own legal reasoning. Even the right of adopted persons to know their own origins 
was restated by the CC in Judgment No. 162/2014 by merely referring to its previous 
Judgment No. 278/2013, without any reference to the ECtHR’s Godelli v. Italy 
Judgment,XXXI which, instead, had really been the ultimate source for the recognition of 
that right. 
The choice of the CC not to mention the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the same matter 
might appear even more surprising in the light of Order No. 150/2012, in which - as 
previously mentioned - the Grand Chamber’s Judgment S.H. was considered a kind of jus 
superveniens that led the CC to choose not to provisionally settle the case. Why then, did the 
CC completely omit to mention the Grand Chamber’s S.H. in particular - and in general, 
any ECtHR’s decision - in Judgment No. 162/2014? 
Actually, in the wake of Judgment No. 162/2014, some have argued that by completely 
disregarding the conventional side of the issue of constitutionality (i.e. that concerning the 
compatibility of Law No. 40/2004 with the ECHR), the CC had wished to show a 
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deferential approach to the ECtHR. Indeed, declaring the unconstitutionality of the ban on 
heterologous insemination for violation of Article 117 It. Const. (and therefore because it 
had infringed Articles 8 and 14 ECHR) would have amounted to contradicting the ECtHR, 
which had in its S.H. Judgment ruled out that the analogous Austrian ban infringed those 
very same ECHR provisions. 
However, this explanation is not entirely convincing. Also, it is worth mentioning that 
the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber closed its S.H. Judgment in the following terms: 
 
‘The Court also notes that the Austrian Constitutional Court, when finding that the legislature had 
complied with the principle of proportionality under Article 8, par. 2 of the Convention, added that the 
principle adopted by the legislature to permit homologous methods of artificial procreation as a rule and 
insemination using donor sperm as an exception reflected the current state of medical science and the 
consensus in society. This, however, did not mean that these criteria would not be subject to 
developments which the legislature would have to take into account in the future. […] The [ECHR] 
Court reiterates that the Convention has always been interpreted and applied in the light of current 
circumstances. Even it finds no breach of Article 8 in the present case, the Court considers that this area, 
in which the law appears to be continuously evolving and which is subject to a particularly dynamic 
development in science and law needs to be kept under review by the Contracting States’.XXXII  
 
That is to say: the ECtHR had decided to anchor its judgment on the merits of the case 
to the time when the case originally arose, therefore at the end of the ’90s. As we can see, 
by merely stating that an evaluation which was perfectly valid when pertaining to a situation 
arising in 1998 no longer needed to be followed in 2014, the Italian CC could have ruled 
the case in an international perspective too, without contradicting the ECtHR. The 
ECtHR, indeed, had underlined in S.H. precisely the relevance of the time factor as crucial 
for a proper settlement of the case. Furthermore, it had already given a generally negative 
evaluation (D’Amico 2014) of Law 40/2004 in the famous Costa and Pavan v. Italy case,XXXIII 
although the ECtHR had focused its analysis more particularly on the ban on 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Therefore, a declaration of unconstitutionality of Law 
No. 40/2004 grounded on the violation of Article 117 It. Const. could also have supported 
the ECtHR’s conclusion in the Costa and Pavan case, by extending its scope to include the 
heterologous insemination issue. 
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More plausibly, therefore, it seems arguable that the CC’s choice to rule the case in 
Judgment No. 162/2014 by focusing on purely domestic constitutional parameters 
depended on circumstances pertaining to the complex relationship between the ECHR and 
the domestic protection of fundamental rights and, ultimately, the relationship between the 
two “constitutional” courts, each ruling its respective system. Putting it differently; in doing 
so, the CC actually seemed to reveal a wish to connect constitutional human rights 
adjudication to the supranational dimension of fundamental rights protection, while at the 
same time not bowing to the ECtHR’s authority. 
The reasons for the CC’s attitude may be found in the special position held by the 
Italian CC at the crossroads of the multilevel protection of fundamental rights in Europe, 
whose peculiar nature depends both on the CC’s relationship with domestic ordinary 
courts and on the specific character of fundamental rights adjudication in Italy. 
The inclination of the CC to promote in so far as is possible the constitutional 
coherence of the domestic legal order through interpretation is well-known: according to 
its traditional jurisprudence, it is up to domestic ordinary courts to interpret ordinary 
legislation consistently with the Constitution without submitting an issue of 
constitutionality before the CC. Only where it is not possible to settle the conflict between 
a law and a constitutional provision by interpretation, and therefore only where a law 
cannot be interpreted coherently with the Constitution, a judicial review of legislation can 
be brought before the CC. However, in doing so, the CC, in so far as it empowers ordinary 
judges to pronounce on human rights issues, ends up by depriving itself of its role as 
human rights adjudicator, though only partially. In contrast, the Italian system of 
constitutional adjudication does not provide individuals the opportunity to bring questions 
directly before the Constitutional Court. A judicial review by the CC can be triggered only 
either by a direct recourse by the State and the Regions, aimed at settling a question 
concerning the delimitation of their legislative competence, or by an issue incidentally 
raised by a judge during a concrete judicial proceeding where the constitutionality of a law 
to be used to settle the case is at stake. Therefore, the CC is not automatically involved 
when an alleged violation of human rights is at issue. 
These circumstances may risk further marginalizing the role of the CC in protecting 
fundamental rights, with particular regard to its relationship with the ECtHR: the latter 
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could be called on to cover a case in which the CC was not involved, resulting in the 
protection of rights being significantly shifted beyond the national borders. 
The most recent ECtHR jurisprudence, indeed, provides clear proof of this trend: in 
some cases, the ECtHR truly became the one and only judge in human rights adjudication, 
although the ECHR was originally shaped as a subsidiary system of protection of rights 
(D’Amico 2015; Sorrenti 2015). 
A single example may serve to explain the Italian CC’s fears: the already mentioned 
Costa and Pavan v. Italy case, concerning the Italian exclusion of preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis for couples that are carriers of genetically transmittable diseases, but not for 
infertile couples. The ECtHR’s previous decisions had already shown that the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies was not an absolute principle, with the result that applicants were 
required to have exhausted internal remedies only when these were available and effective, 
i.e. when they were accessible, capable of offering the applicants satisfaction in redressing 
their grievance, and when they offered a reasonable chance of success. The Costa and Pavan 
v. Italy Judgment represents a precise and concrete application of this attitude: the recourse 
was declared admissible, in fact, even though domestic remedies had not been exhausted 
by any means.XXXIV As the ECtHR asserted, ‘the applicants cannot truly be reproached for 
failing to apply for a measure which, as had been explicitly stated by the Italian 
government, was forbidden in an absolute manner by the law’.XXXV Or, in other words, 
since ‘it was certain that the applicants could not access PGD in Italy, it was useless for 
them to make such an application to the Italian health authorities and to then challenge the 
inevitable rejection of their application before the Italian courts’ (Puppinck 2012: 156). 
In a case like the one we are discussing, it is obvious that by admitting direct recourse 
to the ECHR system when internal remedies, though theoretically accessible, do not 
present any chance of success, the ECtHR reduced the opportunity for the domestic CC to 
intervene preliminarily in order to safeguard the rights at stake at a national level.XXXVI 
The CC’s decision to rule on the case concerning the ban on heterologous 
insemination, solely in the light of domestic constitutional parameters, could therefore be 
plausibly read as a reaction against Strasbourg’s encroachments when the domestic system 
– and the CC in particular – had not yet had the opportunity to redress the violation 
autonomously. In other words, the CC may have aimed to strongly affirm that it is still 
primarily up to the States and national authorities to ensure fundamental rights protection. 
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Only when they are proven inadequate, that is to say where individuals have been denied 
satisfaction because all internal paths have been rejected, can an intervention by the 
ECtHR be admissible and welcome. It is neither admissible nor welcome, on the other 
hand, where domestic ordinary and constitutional courts have not yet had the opportunity 
to redress the violation autonomously.XXXVII 
To conclude, the analysis conducted starting from the case law of the ECtHR and of 
the Italian CC on a similar object, rather than showing a harmonious picture, where the 
different levels of protection integrate to assure human rights protection, has revealed a 
fragmented scenario, characterized by different lines of fractures and convergences. The 
two levels at times seem to converge towards a common path; at other times, instead, they 
give the impression that under the apparent language of human rights at the surface, the 
deep structure of the relationship between levels and Courts is all about authority. After all, 
the multilevel protection of rights is also a tale of Courts, each competing to have the last 
word on human rights adjudication. And precisely for this reason, the relationship between 
the two levels is very similar to the relationship between two tectonic plates, which remain 
side by side, each complementing the other, until the moment they clash under the 
pressure of deep, convective forces, although even clashes may play a positive role, often 
contributing, on the Strasbourg side, to a more pluralistic – and less hegemonic – 
interpretation of the ECHR (Delmas-Marty 2009) and, on the constitutional side, to a more 
open understanding of the rights entrenched in the domestic Constitution. The result of 
such an interaction among national and international levels of protection is therefore not 
completely predictable and cannot be attributed to the simple logic of hierarchy, but at the 
same time it represents the fundamental feature that permits the system to evolve 
dynamically. 
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I See, among many, Judgments Nos. 104/1969, 17/1981, 15/1982, 323/1989, etc. Only Judgment No. 
10/1993 seems to contradict a reconstruction of the ECHR status within the domestic system uniquely based 
on the formal rank of the execution order. Here, the CC states that that the ordinary law transposing the 
ECHR contains ‘provisions arising from a source with atypical competence, and, as such, they are 
insusceptible to being repealed or modified by ordinary laws’ (Tega 2013: 30). This peculiar statement was 
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not, however, reiterated in following decisions. Judgments from the Italian CC are all available at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it  
II As Pollicino argues ‘since this decision, the Constitutional Court has seemed less interested in looking from 
a formal(istic) point of view at the static position of the ECHR in the hierarchy of the sources of law, and 
more interested, from a substantial and axiological point of view, and by reason of its fundamental rights-
based content, in its suitability to complement the recognition of inviolable fundamental rights protected by 
Article 2 of the Constitution’.  
III Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 388/1999, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it (last accessed on 24 
October 2016). 
IV Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 348/2007 and No. 349/2007, English translation available at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it (last accessed on 24 October 2016). 
V In Judgement No.183/1973 (the Frontini Judgement available at www.cortecostituzionale.it – last accessed 
on 15 March 2016) the ICC devised the so called counter-limits doctrine, i.e. the existence of a hard core of 
the constitutional legal order, which cannot be impinged by the supranational order. On the counter-limit 
doctrine see Cartabia (1995) and Pollicino and Martinico (2012). 
VI At least starting from the seminal Constitutional Court Judgment no. 170/1984 (the Granital Judgment 
available at www.cortecostituzionale.it – last accessed on 7 February 2016). 
VII Article 11 provides that ‘Italy agrees, on condition of its equality with other States, to the limitations of 
sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy shall 
promote and encourage international organizations furthering such ends’.  
VIII Constitutional Court Judgment No. 348/2007, § 4.7 (available at www.cortecostituzionale.it – last 
accessed on 7 February 2016). 
IX Judgment No. 317/2009, § 7, available in English at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it/.../S2009317_Amirante_Silvestri_en (last accessed on 23 July 2016). 
X ECHR, S.H. v. Austria, 3 Nov. 2011. 
XI The S.H. v. Austria case was at that time the third case on IVF ruled by the Court of Strasbourg, after the 
two precedents involving UK legislation: ECHR, Evans v. United Kingdom, 10 Apr. 2007 and ECHR, Dickson v. 
United Kingdom, 15 Dec. 2007. 
XII The first applicant is married to the second applicant and the third applicant to the fourth applicant. The 
first applicant suffers from fallopian-tube-related infertility. She produces ova, but, due to her blocked 
fallopian tubes, these cannot pass to the uterus, so natural fertilization is impossible. The second applicant, 
her husband, is infertile. 
The third applicant suffers from agonadism, which means that she does not produce ova at all. She is 
completely infertile but has a fully developed uterus. The fourth applicant, her husband, in contrast to the 
second applicant, is not infertile.  
XIII For sake of completeness, Judgment No. 162 declared also Articles 9 (concerning the prohibition to 
disclaim paternity when resorting to heterologous artificial procreation) and 12 (containing the pecuniary 
penalty for heterologous procreation ban offenders) of Law No. 40/2014 to be unconstitutional. 
XIV Law 40/2004, Article 1, para. 1. 
XV Judgment No. 151/2009 (available at www.cortecostituzionale.it – last accessed on 22 June 2015). 
XVI Judgment No. 162/2014, § 4 In Law. 
XVII Judgment No. 162/2014, § 7 In Law. On the issue of “scientific reasonableness” see Morrone (2014) and 
Penasa (2014).  
XVIII See Supra Section 2. 
XIX More precisely, Order No. 150/2012 described the Grand Chamber’s Judgment as ‘a novum directly 
influencing the issue of constitutionality’ referred by the courts. See Ruggeri (2012); Pellizzone (2012); 
Romboli (2013) and Violini (2014).  
XX Constitutional Court, Order No. 150/2012 (available at www.cortecostituzionale.it – last accessed on 22 
June 2015). 
XXI See e.g. the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 1997, Article 14. 
XXII In fact, a popular referendum aimed at integrally abrogating Law 40/2004 was declared not admissible by 
the CC, due to its character of “constitutionally necessary law” (Judgment No. 45/2005), while the 
referendum focused on the prohibition of heterologous insemination was plainly admitted in Judgment No. 
49/2005 (even if it ultimately failed, having achieved the participation of only 25.6% of people entitled to 
vote). 
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XXIII ECHR, Parrillo v. Italy, 27 Aug. 2015. 
XXIV This actually is a common trend in the CC case law. We can see it, for instance, in Judgment No. 
85/2013, concerning the issue of constitutionality also raised with regard to Article 117, par. 1 (in connection 
with Article 6 ECHR) of legislation aimed at facing the very serious problem of the polluting emissions from 
the Ilva factory in the Taranto area. There too, the CC reiterated that ‘the rationale of the contested provision 
is to strike a reasonable balance between the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution, including in 
particular the right to health (Article 31) and the derived right to a healthy environment, and the right to work 
(Article 4), from which the constitutionally significant interest of maintaining employment along with the 
duty incumbent upon public institutions to make all efforts to that effect are derived. All fundamental rights 
protected by the Constitution are mutually related to one another and it is thus not possible to identify any 
one of them in isolation as prevailing absolutely over the others. Protection must at all times be “systematic 
and not fragmented into a series of rules that are uncoordinated and potentially in conflict with one another”. 
If this were not the case, the result would be an unlimited expansion of one of the rights, which would 
“tyrannizes” other legal interests recognized and protected under constitutional law, which constitute as a 
whole an expression of human dignity’. Therefore, the issue of constitutionality was declared groundless. (See 
§ 9). 
XXV See, among many, Brems (2003); von Staden (2012: 1024); Legg (2012); Letsas (2006), Arai-Takahashi 
(2013); Gerards (2011: 104); Spielmann (2012: 392-411); Mena Parras (2015); Benvenisti (1999: 843). 
XXVI The issue being that, whereas under the previous interpretation of the legislation, payment of 
contributions in Switzerland established entitlement to a pension in Italy on the basis of Italian contributions 
at equivalent salary, no matter that the contribution levels in Switzerland were significantly lower, as a result 
of an enactment providing for an “authentic interpretation”, the Italian pension was to be calculated on the 
basis of the real level of the Swiss contribution, thus resulting in lower pensions. 
XXVII ECHR, Maggio v. Italy, 31 May 2011. 
XXVIII Constitutional Court Judgment No. 264/2012, § 5.3 (available at www.cortecostituzionale.it – last 
accessed on 10 July 2015). 
XXIX ECHR, S.H. v. Austria, para. 94. 
XXX Judgment No. 162/2014, § 6 The Law, which seems to paraphrase the ECtHR’s S.H. decision (see, for 
instance, para. 86) 
XXXI ECHR, Godelli v. Italy, 25 Sept. 2012. 
XXXII ECHR, S.H. v. Austria, para. 118. 
XXXIII ECHR, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, 28 Aug. 2012. 
XXXIV See also, ECHR, Parrillo v. Italy, cit., in which the ECtHR reiterated even more clearly that its decision 
to declare the individual application under examination admissible despite the fact that the prerequisite of the 
previous exhaustion of domestic remedies had not been met, depended primarily on the Italian system of 
Constitutional adjudication which does not provide individuals with the opportunity to bring their cases 
directly before the Constitutional Court. On the relevance accorded by the ECtHR to the direct access to 
CCs within the domestic systems of human rights adjudication, see ECHR, Hasan Uzun v. Turkey, 30 May 
2013. 
XXXV ECHR, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, cit., para. 38. 
XXXVI Perhaps not coincidentally, in Judgment No. 96/2015, which is the internal follow-up of the ECtHR’s 
decision Costa Pavan v. Italy, the CC declared the unconstitutionality of the prohibition for genetic disease 
carrier couples to have access to PGD solely on account of the violation of Articles 3 and 32 It. Const. (the 
former aimed at protecting the principle of equality and the latter at guaranteeing the right to health), all the 
other challenges remaining “absorbed” , included the one concerning Article 117, par. 1 It. Const. (and 
therefore Articles 8 and 14 ECHR). In the CC’s reasoning, the blanket ban on PGD, if read jointly with the 
possibility allowed by the Italian legal system to terminate pregnancy where a fetus is affected by a genetic 
pathology, while introducing an element of inconsistency into the system, was judged “insuperably” 
unreasonable and therefore was declared unconstitutional. Here the message of the CC to the ECtHR 
seemed to be even clearer: it admitted that the outcome of its reasoning was the same as the one achieved by 
the ECtHR by expressly quoting the Judgment of the latter in the Costa and Pavan case. Nevertheless, it 
anchored its reasoning to uniquely internal parameters. The same outcome, but reached by a different path, 
we might say: as if it wished to restate that the domestic constitutional system can already possess all the tools 
with which to redress fundamental rights violations autonomously if it was given the opportunity to do so.  
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XXXVII It is however worth noting that in Judgment No. 84/2016 – concerning, like the Parrillo Judgment, the 
ban on donating embryos to scientific research as provided by Law No. 40 – while quoting the latter, the 
Italian CC expressly adhered to the ECtHR’s approach. It declared indeed the question as inadmissible, 
pertaining the balance between the conflicting interests and values at stake to the political discretion of the 
Parliament. This reference to the Strasbourg jurisprudence was, however, considered by some Authors as a 
symptom of a coward attitude from the CC, seeming the latter to use the Parrillo Judgment as a shield in order 
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